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Risk in agriculture, as in life, is everywhere. But dealing with it systematically, whether for
farmers, researchers or anyone, is difficult. One reason for the difficulty is confusion and
differences of opinion about what risk is and how it can be measured. The first purpose of
this paper, therefore, is to offer some suggested answers to these questions. Then some
approaches to the analysis of risky choices are canvassed, particularly in the context of
agricultural production systems. Matters considered include how to estimate risk aversion
among target groups of farmers, how to derive and refine probabilities to describe relevant
uncertainty, and how to integrate these components into risk analyses.
Risk analysis has become increasingly popular in recent years. Unfortunately, some analysts
have been rather cavalier in the way that they have applied the theory and methods of
decision analysis. Given the complexity of risk analysis it is hardly surprising that some
mistakes have been made and that there is scope for disagreement on how to proceed.. A
second objective of this paper, therefore, is to identify some of the main areas of difficulty
and possible confusion and to suggest more theoretically sound concepts and practicable
methods.
Defining risk
Even supposed experts use the term ‘risk’ in several different ways. These differences cause
considerable confusion especially when systematic efforts are made to measure risk and to
evaluate it. Among the many usages of the word, three common interpretations are:
1. the chance of a bad outcome;
2. the variability of outcomes, i.e. the converse of stability; and4
4
3. uncertainty of outcomes.
Although seemingly similar, these three definitions imply quite different ways of measuring
risk. Moreover, when formally defined they can be seen to be mutually inconsistent. It will
be argued here that, while the first two meanings are in common usage, clarity is best served
by defining risk, at least for formal analyses, as the uncertainty of outcomes.
Measuring risk
Let’s look at each of the above definitions in turn to see how risk might be measured for
each.
'The chance of a bad outcome’ implies the probability of some defined unsatisfactory
outcome happening. Assume for simplicity that there is a single measure of outcome, X,
more of which is always preferred to less. This definition of risk might be represented by the
probability P* = P(X < X*), where P is probability, X is the uncertain outcome, and X* is
some cut-off or minimally acceptable outcome level below which outcomes are regarded as
‘bad’. In some cases, the value of X* might reflect some disaster level such as ‘starvation’
or ‘bankruptcy’, but in most cases it may be a less clear-cut notion, so that application of
this measure of risk requires specification of the two parameters P* and X*.
Risk as variability may be measured by some statistic of dispersion of the distribution of
outcomes, such as the variance or standard deviation of X, V = V[X] or SD, equal to the
positive square root of V. Obviously, neither statistic alone tells anything about the location
of the distribution of outcomes on the X axis. So it is common for those who think of risk as
dispersion of outcomes to link V or SD with the mean or expected value E = E[X]. Then
variance may be described as the risk around the specified mean. Building on this notion,
some authors, such as Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), have found it convenient to reflect risk
using the coefficient of variation of X, CV = SD/E.
Finally, adopting the definition of risk as the distribution of outcomes requires the whole
distribution of  X to be specified. Complete specification requires the probability density
function,  f(X), or equivalently and often more conveniently, the cumulative distribution
function  F(X). However, summary statistics including moments are commonly used to
describe the probability distribution, implying some similarity with the measurements based
on the definition of risk as dispersion. For a few special cases, such as the normal, the
distribution of outcomes is fully defined by only the mean and variance. Other distributions
might be approximated in terms of these first two moments, though higher order moments
may be needed to tell more about the shape of the distribution. For some arbitrary
distribution, however, description by moments will be an approximation the adequacy of
which is not easily judged.
1
The weakness of the first two definitions of risk with their associated measures is that neither
'tells the whole story' when a choice has to be faced amongst risky alternatives. In regard to
the first definition, it is clear from observing behaviour that not all risks with bad outcomes
                                                
1 Note that some of the usual statistical tests of normality may be misleading in that small deviations in,
say, the location of the lower tail of the distribution compared with the normal may be discounted in the
test, but may be very important to a risk-averse decision maker.5
are rejected. For example, most people will travel by car for sightseeing￿an activity that
certainly increases the probability of death or serious injury in a road accident. Evidently,
choices with chances of very bad outcomes (e.g. death or serious injury) are sometimes
accepted, presumably because the benefits of the up-side consequences (e.g. seeing
interesting sights) are sufficiently appealing to offset the relatively low chances of the bad
outcome. It follows that to evaluate or assess a risk we need to be able to consider the
whole range of outcomes, good and bad, and their associated probabilities. Descriptions of
risk expressed in terms of only the probability in the lower tail of the distribution of outcomes
do not provide full information for proper risk assessment, and so may be seriously
misleading.
A similar argument shows the limitation of variance alone as a measure for risk evaluation.
Consider two normal distributions of outcomes of, say, net income, with identical variances
but different means. Everyone will prefer the one with the higher mean. Moreover, many
would describe the distribution located further to the right as the less risky of the two since
the chance of getting less than any specified level of X is lower for this distribution than for
the one with the lower mean.
2 On the other hand, using variance as the measure of risk
suggests that the two distributions are equally risky. Clearly, we could avoid such confusion
by interpreting measures of dispersion or stability simply as what they are, and not regarding
them as 'stand alone' measures of risk.
If risk is defined as variance but is always interpreted in conjunction with the mean, this
definition might seem to be similar to defining risk as the distribution of outcomes but then
using an E,V approximation of the distribution. But the problem inherent in defining risk as
variance already noted still remains. Not all shifts in E,V space that reduce variance will lead
to more preferred E,V combinations for a risk-averse decision maker (DM); if both E and
V are reduced, the effect on preference is indeterminate unless the degree of risk aversion is
known. Hence, it seems unwise and potentially confusing to describe every prospect with
lower variance as ‘less risky’.
Adopting the third option of defining risk as the full distribution of outcomes means that there
is no one statistic that can be used to measure risk, so that it becomes impossible to
compare distributions in terms of their ‘riskiness’. While this might seem to make the notion
of risk elusive, in fact, the absence of such a single measure proves to be no impediment to
the comparative assessment of alternative risky prospects, as discussed below. What this
third view of risk implies is that notions of ‘more’ or ‘less’ risk (‘more risky’ versus ‘less
risky’ prospects) are unsatisfactory, and careful analysts will confine themselves to
describing risky prospects as ‘preferred’ versus ‘not preferred’, or as ‘risk efficient’ versus
‘not risk efficient’.
                                                
2  Pandey (personal communication) has shown that, for the normal distribution, the coefficient of
variation is equivalent to the measurement of risk as the probability of a ‘bad’ outcome, provided the
safety-first level of outcome is near to zero. For the two normal distributions mentioned, the one to the




There is a good reason why none of the conventional statistical measures of a distribution
can provide a full description of the entailed risk. As the example of car travel for sightseeing
shows, risk assessment requires both probabilities and preferences for outcomes. Chances
of bad versus good outcomes can only be evaluated and compared knowing the DM's
relative preferences for such outcomes.
According to the subjective expected utility (SEU) hypothesis (Anderson, Dillon and
Hardaker, 1977, pp. 66-69; Savage 1954)) the DM’s utility function for outcomes is
needed to assess risky prospects. The SEU hypothesis states that the utility, or index of
relative preference, of a risky prospect is the DM’s expected utility for that prospect,
meaning the weighted average of the utilities of outcomes. This index is computed using the
DM’s subjective probabilities for outcomes as weights and using the DM’s utility function to
encode preferences for outcomes. Faced with a choice amongst alternative risky prospects,
the hypothesis is that the prospect with the highest expected utility is preferred.
The expected utility of any risky prospect can be converted through the inverse utility
function into a certainty equivalent (CE). Ranking prospects by  CE will be the same as
ranking them by expected utility, i.e. in the order preferred by the DM. Moreover, the
difference between the CE and the expected value of a risky prospect, known as the risk
premium (RP), is a measure of the cost of risk:
RP = E – CE. (1)
For risk-averse DMs, RP will be positive and its magnitude will depend on both the
distribution of outcomes and the DM’s attitude to risk.
For some uses it may be convenient to compute the proportional risk premium,  PRP,
defined as:
PRP = RP/E, (2)
i.e. the proportion of the expected value of the risky project absorbed by the risk premium
in computing the CE. The more risk averse is the DM or the more uncertain the risky
prospect, the higher will be the PRP.
In relation to the earlier discussion of the problems of defining and measuring risk, the CE
may be taken to be a measure of risk efficiency, meaning that a risky prospect with a higher
CE will be preferred to one with a lower CE. On the other hand, while RP and PRP
measure the actual and proportional costs of risk, respectively, they should not be taken to
measure risk per se; since CE depends on both E and RP, considering only the latter term
can lead to similar confusion as can arise in treating V alone as a measure of risk.
Moreover, as we shall see later, risk aversion itself is an elusive concept that depends on the
context. In particular, we need to be very clear about what measure of outcome is being
used.
Risk aversion and the utility function
The above discussion shows that risk cannot be assessed without accounting for the risk
attitude of the DM. According to the SEU hypothesis, risk preference is reflected in the7
DM’s utility function for consequences. The shape of such a utility function specifies an
individual’s attitude to risk. Several attempts have been made, therefore, to elicit such utility
functions from farmers in order to put the SEU hypothesis to work in the analysis of risky
prospects in agriculture. Usually the results have been rather unconvincing. There is evidence
that the functions obtained are vulnerable to interviewer bias and to bias from the way
questions are framed.
Some of the difficulties in utility function elicitation may be reduced by wise choice of the
measure of outcome. It is clear, for example, that people assess losses and gains differently
from how they view, say, income or wealth. This seemingly irrational behaviour is called
‘failure in asset integration’, or ‘the endowment effect’, and raises the question of what to do
about it. For normative decision analysis, it does not seem sensible to base
recommendations on such seemingly inconsistent preferences.
Plausible utility functions are most often obtained from elicitation of the utility of wealth, and
it seems likely that utility functions for income will often be more convincing than those for
losses and gains. However, these sorts of suppositions need to be tested as part of the
further consideration of the practicality of ‘full-blown’ implementation of the SEU hypothesis
in agricultural decision analysis.
The truth is, however, that few people are able to articulate their risk preferences
consistently. Some efforts have been made to circumvent the elicitation difficulties by
estimating risk aversion from observed behaviour, usually using cross-sectional data. While
these methods certainly cannot be dismissed, given the lack of success of more direct
methods, they all suffer from the fundamental weakness of being based on the assumption
that the farmer and the analyst share the same probabilities about the risky phenomena at
issue. In so far as this assumption is invalid, the results will be biased. Too, errors in model
specification tend to be rolled into the estimated risk aversion coefficient, causing further
bias.
Measures of risk aversion
For simplicity, we start by assuming that we are assessing risk aversion in respect of the
DM’s wealth, i.e. that there is an actual or implicit utility function  U = U(W). Later we
consider the implications of utility expressed in terms of other measures such as income or
losses and gains.
Because of perceived difficulties in getting empirical measures of risk aversion, it may be
necessary to make some strong assumptions about the degree of risk aversion of farmers if
any analysis of risk is to be performed. However, measuring degree of risk aversion is not
simple for a couple or reasons. First, a utility function is defined only up to a positive linear
transformation. Any measure of risk aversion, which is essentially a measure of curvature of
the utility function, must remain constant for such a transformation. Second, as noted above,
we need to be clear about what is the argument of the utility function.
The simplest measure of risk aversion that is constant for a positive linear transformation of
the utility function is the absolute risk aversion function:
ra(W) = -U''(W)/U'(W) (3)8
8
where U''(W) and U'(W) represent the second and first derivatives of the utility function,
respectively (Arrow 1965, p. 33; Pratt 1964). It is generally accepted that  ra(W) will
decrease with increases in W.
Absolute risk aversion is a much used and abused concept. First, note that it is a function,
not a constant, as is often implied. Moreover, although robust enough to be unaffected by a
positive linear transformation of the utility function, absolute risk aversion is still measured in
the monetary units of W. Thus, risk aversion coefficients derived in different currency units
are not comparable. It is invalid to transport a coefficient estimated for US farmers in US
dollars to an analysis of an Australian farm management problem where outcomes are
expressed in Australian dollars or worse, thousands of dollars of Australian dollars.
The currency units problem is overcome using the concept of relative risk aversion, defined
as
rr(W) = Wra(W) (4)
This measure of risk aversion is a pure number which can be used in international
comparisons of risk aversion, only remembering that, like ra(W), rr(W) is a function, not a
constant. While there is general agreement that ra(W) declines as wealth increases, there is
less agreement on how rr(W) is likely to be affected by increases in wealth. Arrow (1965, p.
36) argues on theoretical and empirical grounds that it would generally be an increasing
function of W. However, he noted that some flutuations are possible, but suggested that the
actual value should hover around 1, being, if anything, somewhat less for low wealths and
somewhat higher for high wealths. Similarly, Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1992, p. 46)
hypothesised that, if wealth increases, relative risk aversion does not decrease. On the other
hand, Hamal and Anderson (1982) found that, in extremely resource-poor farming
situations, relative risk aversion could reach values as extreme as four or more – quite
contrary to what Arrow had hypothesised. Such disagreement might be taken to indicate
that rr(W) is likely to be more constant than ra(W) as W changes.
Obviously, the choice of any particular form of utility function has implications for ra(W) and
rr(W). For example, the widely used negative exponential function U = 1 - exp(-cW) has
the property that ra(W) is equal to the constant c (constant absolute risk aversion - CARA)
and the seemingly unlikely property of increasing relative risk aversion. On the other hand,
the power function U = W
c, 0 < c < 1 has decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The power function reduces to U = ln (W) when
rr(W) = 1. A special form of the CRRA power function that has significant operational
advantages is  U = {1/(1 –  r)}W
(1 – r), where  r is the constant relative risk aversion
coefficient.
Constant absolute risk aversion means that preferences amongst risky prospects are
unchanged if a constant amount is added to or subtracted from all payoffs. Constant relative
risk aversion means that preferences are unchanged if all payoffs are multiplied by a positive
constant.
Plausible assumptions about risk aversion
In the past, it has been common to assume, often implicitly, that all farmers are indifferent to
risk. Such an assumption is necessary to justify the many farm management budgets that are9
done with no accounting at all for risk. Such an assumption seems to be a second-best
option when we know that risk aversion is widespread. A more sensible course, if there is
no other information at all, might be to assume a relative risk aversion coefficient of 1.0. The
constant relative risk averse function for r = 1 is U = ln(W), the so-called ‘everyman’s’
utility function postulated by Daniel Bernoulli as long ago as 1738.
If this seems to be too strong an assumption, Anderson and Dillon (1992) have proposed a
rough and ready classification of degree of risk aversion, based on the magnitude of the
relative risk aversion coefficient, that some might find plausible. Their classification is:
rr(W)= 0.5 : hardly risk averse at all;
rr(W) = 1.0 : somewhat risk averse (normal);
rr(W) = 2.0 : rather risk averse;
rr(W) = 3.0 : very risk averse;
rr(W) = 4.0 : extremely risk averse.
The estimates of risk aversion might to validated to some extent by constructing a
representative risky prospect, computing its CE using the CRRA function with rr equal to
the tentatively chosen value, and then asking the DM whether the implied indifference
between the risky prospect and the sure thing seems reasonable.
If ra(W) is needed, and if it is assumed that rr(W) is more or less constant for local variation
in wealth, ra(W) may be derived using the formula ra(W) = rr(W)/W.
Such approximations might be made for some target group of farmers in the work of
research stations and extension agencies, leading to an estimate of the range of ra that might
be plausible. This range can be used in risk analysis for such specific contexts.
Utility of what? The effect of choice of payoff measure
So far, we have considered utility and risk aversion only in terms of wealth. What happens
when we move to outcomes measured in other ways, such as in terms of income or losses
and gains? Consider the latter first. A loss or gain can be viewed as simply a change in






where W is wealth after the event, W0 is initial wealth and X is the loss or gain. If we assume
that either W0 is known for sure or that X and W0 are stochastically independent
3, then we
should expect a rational person to make the same choice whether the risky outcomes are
expressed in terms of wealth or gains/losses.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence does not support this proposition. Typically, we find that
people are much more risk averse when asked to contemplate gains and losses than they are
if the same risky prospect is presented to them in terms of wealth. The effect is know as
failure in asset integration because gains and losses are not intuitively integrated into a wealth
                                                
3 These assumptions may be too strong in some cases. We consider later the case where an additional
risky prospect is added to an existing risky portfolio with stochastic dependency between the two.10
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assessment. Such behaviour can be argued to be irrational and in what follows we assume
that a rational person who wants to make wise risky choices would be prepared to use logic
rather than intuition to derive implications for choices expressed in gains/losses from a
carefully chosen utility function for wealth.
Recall that constant absolute risk aversion means that preferences are unchanged if a
constant is added to or subtracted from all payoffs – the exact situation we have here.
Therefore, if we do not want preference to change whether we express outcomes in terms
of W or X, we can specify that ra(W) = ra(X). Then, as before, rr(W) = Wra(W) so ra(W) =
rr(W)/W. Moreover, rr(X) = Xra(X) by definition, but ra(X) = ra(W) so
rr(X) = Xra(W) = (X/W)rr(W) (6)
In other words, in assessing risky choices expressed in terms of losses and gain, it is not
correct to apply the same relative risk aversion coefficient as for wealth. Moreover, the
smaller is X relative to W, the smaller is the applicable relative risk aversion coefficient. The
relative risk aversion function rr(X) in equation (6) is also sometimes called the partial risk
aversion function since it refers to only part of the payoff as shown in equation (5).
Now let’s consider risky choice where payoffs are expressed in terms of income.  At least
two types of risky choices affecting farm income can be imagined. One is where the income
next year (or in some single year in the future) is uncertain. This is the typical situation when
doing annual farm planning. The uncertainty in the outcomes stems largely from the year to
year unpredictability yields, prices and costs that affect farmers’ incomes. This type of
uncertainty contrasts with longer term uncertainty as when a farmer may be contemplating a
major investment perhaps associated with a dramatic change to the farming system. Here the
uncertainty is about the long-run level of income. The distinction between the two is similar
to the distinction Friedman (1957) drew between  permanent income and  transitory
income in his work on the consumption function.
Drawing further on Friedman’s ideas, it seems clear that transitory income can be treated in
decision analysis rather like losses and gains. We could write:





where  y is transitory income and  cp is Friedman’s permanent consumption, assumed
constant. Defining X = y - cp converts equation (7) into equation (5), so the matter will not
be pursued further since identical conclusions apply as for risk aversion with payoffs as
losses and gains.
Now consider what happens when it is long-run or permanent income that is risky and the
focus of attention. It seems reasonable to assume that a rational person will view their wealth
as equal to the capitalised value of future (permanent) income flows with the capitalisation
factor calculated over expected future lifetime.




                                                
4 The income stream may also include a terminal value of assets, if an individual sees it as important to
leave assets for their descendants.11
where  W is current wealth,  Y is the annual permanent after-tax income and k  is the
appropriate capitalisation factor, k > 1. Then, since wealth is viewed as a fixed multiple of
income (and vice versa), a rational individual will assign the same proportional risk premium
to a given risky prospect whether the payoffs are expressed in wealth or in terms of the
equivalent permanent income. This is equivalent to the proposition that
rr(W) = rr(kY) = rr(Y) (9)
where rr(.) is the relative risk aversion function.
Since ra(W) = rr(W)/W and ra(Y) = rr(Y)/Y, then ra(Y) = rr(W)/Y or
ra(Y) = (W/Y) ra(W).  (10)
Finally, since k = W/Y from equation (8), then ra(Y) = kra(W). In other words, ra(Y) is k
times as large as  ra(W) where  k is the relevant capitalisation factor of approximate
magnitude 10.
By way of postscript to the above discussion of the effect of choice of argument of a utility
function on risk aversion, it should have become apparent that there are likely to be very
substantial difficulties in inferring anything about the appropriate degree of risk aversion if
payoffs are expressed in other ways than those canvassed above. It becomes very hard
indeed to see how the appropriate degree of risk aversion can be derived for such measures
as gross margin per hectare of crop, per kilogram of milk produced or per dollar invested.
Still worse are attempts to derive the appropriate degree of risk aversion for compare
distribution of, say, crop yield per hectare. Yet it is not unusual to come across examples of
results expressed and analysed in just such partial terms.
The importance of risk aversion
An indication of the implications for risky choice of different degrees of risk aversion can be
obtained from the approximation (Freund 1956):
CE = E – 0.5raV (11)
where CE is certainty equivalent, E is expected payoff, ra is the appropriate absolute risk
aversion coefficient (assumed constant) and V is variance of payoff.
5 Then the approximate
risk premium, RP, is given by
RP = E – CE = 0.5raV. (12)
Multiplying through by  E/E
2 gives the proportional risk premium  PRP, representing the
proportion of the expected payoff of a risky prospect that a DM would be willing to pay to
trade away all the risk for a sure thing:
PRP = RP/E = 0.5raE(V/E
2) = 0.5rrC
2 (13)
                                                
5 The relationship is exact for the negative exponential utility function with constant absolute risk
aversion if the returns are normally distributed (Freund). For other cases the approximation may be
derived as a truncated Taylor series expansion omitting terms after the second. The omitted terms
incorporate products of successive derivatives of the utility function and successively higher-order
moments of the utility function.12
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where C is the coefficient of variation of the risky prospect, equal to the standard deviation
divided by the mean. For example, if rr = 2 and C = 0.2, PRP = 0.04. Similarly, if rr = 4
and C = 0.3, PRP = 0.18. Note, however, that, for reasons explored above, magnitudes of
rr such as 2 or 4 are only likely to apply for risky prospects expressed in terms of
permanent income or total wealth.
The impact of risk aversion will be different to the above for DMs assessing a marginal
additional risky prospect (Anderson 1989). If such a marginal risky prospect is evaluated in
terms of gains and losses, X, relative to initial wealth  W0, now treated as uncertain, the
relevant risk premium is
RP[X] = 0.5raDV (14)
where
DV = V[X] +V[W0] +2Cov[X, W0] – V[W0]
      = V[X] +2rS[X]S[W0] (15)
where  Cov is covariance,  r is the relevant correlation coefficient and  S  is standard
deviation. (In equation (1) we assume that ra(X) = ra(W0) = ra(W)  = ra, i.e. a constant, as in




      = 0.5rp(X)C[X]
2 + rp(X)rC[X]S[W0]/E[X] (16)
where rp is partial risk aversion for gains or losses defined as:
rp(X) = ra(W0)X = E[X]/E[W0] rr(W0) = Zrr(W0) (17)
with Z = E[X]/E[W0]. However, since E[X] = ZE[W0], the proportional risk deduction for
X can be written as:
PRPX = 0.5 rp(X)C[X]
2 + rp(X)rC[X]C[W0]/Z
     = 0. 5rr(W0)ZC[X]
2 + rr(W0)rC[X]C[W0]
     = rr(W0)C[X]{0.5ZC[X] + rC[W0]}. (18)
By way of illustration, Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (1997) give the case for rr(W0) =
1.0, C[X] = 0.3, Z = 0.1, r = 0.5 and C[Y] = 0.2, yielding a value for PRPX of 0.035. In
other words, for the values indicated the DM would be willing to sacrifice only 3.5 per cent
of E[X] to avoid the associated additional variance. The same authors show the value of
PRPX for a range of other plausible values of the variables, mostly indicating that the
additional risk aversion is relatively small.
As shown by equation (18) and illustrated above, the cost of risk may be a small proportion
of the expected value for some transiently risky prospect that constitutes only a part of the
risk faced by a farm household. While it is an empirical matter, many such marginal risks in
diversified agricultural systems may have near-zero values of PRP, so that choices can be
based on expected values alone. Even when PRP values are somewhat larger, the ranking
of alternatives based on expected payoffs may be the same as that based on expected utility.
At least, this seems likely in such matters as the choice among alternative crop varieties to be
used on just part of the farm when the alternatives may have broadly similar yield stability
characteristics but significantly different mean yields. Moreover, even when the ranking of13
marginal risky prospects based on expected values differs from that based on expected
utility or certainty equivalents, the cost of making the wrong choice using the expected value
rule may be low in CE terms.
If empirical testing shows the costs of risk to be small for a range of actual farm situations, it
is good news for scientists who can focus more intently on developing technologies that
improve expected returns without worrying too much about stability.
More generally, because in many practical choice situation the cost of risk may be relatively
small, it can be argued that agricultural economists have paid too much attention to risk
aversion, at least relative to efforts to get good specifications of the probability distributions
of outcomes. If these distributions are mis-specified, the estimate of E will be biased, which
may matter more than the error in calculating  RP due to using the wrong risk aversion
coefficient. Moreover, the focus on risk aversion and the cost of risk may have been a
source of confusion in that attention has been directed to reducing the cost of risk rather than
on finding the most risk-efficient option (erroneously minimising RP rather than maximising
CE).
Such mistaken emphasis on risk reduction may come from analyses of risk from a policy
perspective where risk can be viewed as a friction to resource allocation by farmers. Risk
aversion may lead farmers to use resources less intensively than would be the case if they
were indifferent to risk, at least for decisions important to them. Yet, from a social welfare
perspective, most risks faced by individual farmers or groups of farmers are very
unimportant. This is evident from equation 8 applied to a farm-level risk in a social setting; in
that case Z will be small since national income from other sources will be large, and the
relevant correlation will be small because of the diversified nature of the rest of the economy.
It therefore becomes a potentially legitimate role of public policy to consider the scope to
reduce the cost of risk to farmers in order to reduce the social welfare loss from farm-level
risk aversion. It is, of course, quite another matter to decide whether interventions to reduce
such welfare losses are justified. Given the high information needs and the likely difficulty and
high cost of devising appropriate interventions, the chances are that, in most cases,
governments should leave well alone. This view is reinforced by the point argued earlier in
this section that, for many farm-level decisions, the risk friction might well be less than seems
to be widely believed.
Probabilities for decision analysis
Both the SEU hypothesis and common sense lead to the conclusions that the right
probabilities to use for decision analysis are the DM’s subjective probabilities. A subjective
probability may be defined as the degree of belief that an individual has in a given
proposition. Many people have difficulty in coming to terms with such a ‘subjectivist’ view
of the world, especially those who have been trained in the ‘objectivist’ school of thought in
which probability is defined as the limit of a relative frequency ratio. It is worth emphasising,
therefore, that Savage (1954) has elegantly synthesised the strands of expected utility and
subjective probablility. However, this is not the place seek to convince the unconverted of
the merits of the subjectivist view. Moreover, fortunately, the gap between the two schools
of thought need not be as wide as these different definitions may seem to imply.14
14
Taking a subjectivist view of probability, it is clear that, if faced with some risky choice, a
rational person will seek to make his or her probability assessments as reliable as possible.
This means he or she will want to gather evidence about the uncertain phenomena of interest
until, in some approximate sense, the marginal cost of further information gathering rises to
equal marginal benefit. Moreover, such a person will be particularly on the lookout for
relevant relative frequency data to guide subjective probability judgment. If abundant and
relevant data exist, the evidence will swamp any prior subjective beliefs, and there will be no
practical difference between the probabilities used by a member of the objectivist school
and a subjectivist.
Differences obviously come more into prominence when relevant data are few or absent—
an all too common case. Here, according to the subjectivist, it is still possible for the analysis
to proceed relying on the wholly or predominantly subjective probabilities of the DM.
Unfortunately, however, that presents some difficulties for research and extension
organisation for whom it is seldom possible to tailor recommendations to match the beliefs of
individual farmers. Clearly, something more ‘objective’ would be desirable, especially in
undertaking analysis intended to be of widespread relevance and acceptability.
Probabilities that have been derived based on thoughtful analysis of all relevant information
can be described as ‘public’ probabilities, in the sense that many people might be willing to
accept them as reasonable. Such public probabilities are the ones that could sensibly be
used in analyses of, say, the risks of technology adoption in a given farming system. They
can form the basis of at least tentative recommendations to farmers about what technologies
appear to be risk efficient, although, of course, the probabilities are likely to be revised as
more information comes available from accumulating experience with a technology.
Getting better probabilities
Getting ‘better’ probabilities when hard data are few or absent is no easy task, and
considerable ingenuity and judgment are needed to make the best of a bad job. The topic is
a sadly neglected one in the literature of agricultural economics. We suggest that there is a
need to work towards a ‘code of best practice’, meaning that the approach to deriving
probabilities should be based on careful thought and debate about what is reasonable in
various types of situations.
Some rules of such a code, if ever properly developed, might include the following:
•  Take pains to seek out and make good use of such relevant data as exist.
•  On the other hand, never thoughtlessly use historical data that are not temporally and
spatially relevant. For example, data from the past (where all historical data come from)
may not be a good basis for making decisions about the future if the world has changed.
Data of dubious relevance may need to be adjusted for any obvious bias, supplemented
with more subjective judgments, or even ignored entirely.
•  Where data are sparse, unreliable or of limited relevance, examine the costs and benefits
of collecting more good-quality data for the assessment task at hand.
•  As new data are accumulated, incorporate them appropriately into the probability
judgments; Bayesian procedures will sometimes be helpful here in ensuring consistency.15
•  In the absence of hard data, make use of the views of people who should know best
about the uncertain processes of interest.
•  When consulting such experts, use more than one, and select people who will bring
different insights to the estimation. Then use a sound method (such as Delphi) to seek
convergence towards a consensus.
•  Take steps to avoid biases in probabilities, however obtained. Where bias is suspected,
consider and apply the best method you can devise to correct for the bias.
•  Use smoothing methods to minimise implausible irregularities in distributions. Most
distributions are smooth and unimodal. This observation suggests that best practice will
require extensive use of the fractile rule to estimate points on the CDF, and then use of
some procedure to smooth the curve through the obtained points (Anderson, Dillon and
Hardaker, 1977, pp. 42-44). Smoothing will usually be vital for sparse data situations,
but also makes sense in many situations with relatively abundant data. Not smoothing is
equivalent to asserting that you expect the underlying distribution from which future
outcomes are drawn to have the same ‘bumps’ present as displayed in the historical
data, which is seldom likely.
•  Avoid forcing probabilities to fit some pre-determined functional form unless there are
good reasons to presume that that form is really appropriate. Experience with the
software for fitting distributions to data points suggests that smoothing by eye is nearly
always better than forcing the distribution to fit some standard form, such as the normal.
Of course, that is not the case if there is some good reason to suppose that the process
generating the distribution will lead to a particular form of distribution.
•  Use ‘triangulation’ whenever practicable to compare probabilities for the same uncertain
quantity obtained from different sources or in different ways.
•  Take care to recognise and account for at least the main sources of risk affecting the
outcomes of some risky prospect. In particular, avoid the trap of assuming that
‘everything goes according to plan’ (EGAP) when Murphy’s Law and common
experience both teach that such persistent good fortune is rare. Predicting the expected
output of nonlinear stochastic systems by using the mean or modal values of stochastic
input variables is a widespread EGPA error.
•  Take care not to overlook important stochastic dependencies in obtaining probabilities
for more than one uncertain quantity.
•  Make the assessment process transparent—always tell what you did.
In Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (1997) some of these ideas are developed a little
further. For example, a procedure to transform historical information on farm activity net
revenues into a representation of the relevant joint distribution for use in planning is
described and illustrated. Sources of bias in human probability assessments are illustrated
and the use of proper scoring rules to train experts to be less biased is described.
If the notion of a code of best practice applied to probability assessment seems far-fetched,
it is worth pointing out that probabilities are necessary only because knowledge about the
world is imperfect. All inquiry, including all agricultural research, can be viewed as human
efforts aimed at adding to knowledge, i.e. towards the refinement of prior probabilities that16
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may have been based on anything from ‘the wisdom of the ages’ through unsubstantiated
supposition to pure superstition. Therefore, all the methods of systematic inquiry, including
the so-called ‘scientific method’, can be seen as part of a tacitly accepted code of practice
for upgrading probability judgments.
On methods of risk analysis
Modern computer software has revolutionised the scope for risk analysis. Packages such as
DATA from TreeAge and Precision Tree from Palisade have made the construction and
analysis of decision trees much easier. But probably of more general applicability in
agricultural risk analysis is the @Risk add-in to spreadsheets such as Excel. Recent versions
of @Risk for Excel seems more reliable than previous versions and are certainly easier to
use.
Using this software, quite refined stochastic budgets can readily be constructed. Such
budgets can also be viewed and used as stochastic simulation models. The software allows
key variables in the model to be specified as uncertain quantities with defined probability
distributions. There is a wide choice of form for such distributions. Stochastic dependency
between variables can be approximated using rank correlation coefficients (or can be built in
to the model by the analyst in other ways). Once completed, the model is run for a sufficient
number of iterations using Monte Carlo sampling for the specified stochastic input variables
in order to provide information about the distributions of selected output variables.
Such models can readily be used in farming systems work to evaluate alternative risky
prospects, such as improved technologies. Experiments can be designed and implemented
to compare alternative ‘treatments’, such as with versus without the prospective technology.
If the DM’s utility function is known, treatments can be compared in terms of calculated CE
values. If the utility function is not known but something can be inferred about the relevant
range of risk attitudes, the treatments can be partitioned into dominated and efficient sub-
sets. In some cases, the efficient set may contain only one prospect, indicating the optimal
choice. When the set contains more than one risky prospect, the final choice must be a
matter for the DM, or for each individual DM where the analysis is being performed for
some target group.
Methods of performing such risk-efficiency analysis are particularly important for the work
of agricultural research and extension organisations. They include mean-variance analysis,
stochastic efficiency analysis, and particularly stochastic dominance with respect to a
function (SDRF), and are sufficiently well known not to require further discussion here.
Stochastic budgeting can be extended to represent dynamic aspects of the risky systems
being studied. However, if system dynamics lie at the core of a particular analysis, other
powerful software is available to help. The package Stella II (and some other similar
packages) allows the dynamics of any system to be represented as a simulation model that is
developed first on screen in flow-chart format. Later, the underlying relationships can be
quantified and the system run in dynamic fashion to observe performance. It is possible to
include relevant stochastic components in the model, using Monte Carlo methods, to
generate distributions of output variables. Stella II runs well on modern PCs.17
The computer and software revolution has also brought the capacity to solve linear and
nonlinear programming models to the risk analyst’s desktop. Using GAMS, farming systems
can be modelled in the constrained optimisation framework of mathematical programming,
maximising some representation of expected utility. Such formulations also allow the risk-
efficient set of solutions to be generated as part of a process of evaluating alternative
technologies or policy interventions for risk-averse farmers.
More information on methods of risk analysis, including simple illustrations of most of the
software packages mentioned here, is given in Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson (1997).
Summing up
Accounting for risk in the analysis of farming systems is much harder than pretending it
doesn’t exist. In the past, the difficulties have been compounded by confusion over just what
risk is and how it can be measured. In the first part of this paper, an attempt has been made
to resolve that difficulty. It seems that risk is best formalised as the whole distribution of
outcomes.
Risk analysis in agriculture has stumbled in the past because of difficulties in assessing and
categorising farmers’ attitudes to risk. While no easy solutions to these problems are offered
in this paper, it is argued that risk aversion may not be as important for some choices as
commonly believed. Moreover, as described above, there are some rough and ready ways
to estimate the relevant range of risk aversion for some target group. Methods of stochastic
efficiency analysis then allow at least something to be said about better and worse solutions.
Some risk analyses that have been based on brave assumptions about the degree of risk
aversion have overlooked some of the complexity in making the move from utility of wealth
to utility of gains and losses or the utility of income. Moreover, very few such analyses have
recognised that risk aversion for permanent income is likely to be much more important than
is risk aversion for transitory income.
Risk analysis has also been avoided in the past because so many would-be analysts were
afraid to tackle the evaluation of risky choices when too few hard data were available to
work out the required probability distributions ‘objectively’. Too many of those who braved
the waters of risk analysis left untold or under-emphasised the dubious relevance to the
problem at hand of the data they used to represent uncertainty. It seems that the task of
finding better ways to deduce the probability distributions that describe the risks that farmers
face has been relatively neglected by agricultural economists. A part of this paper is
therefore devoted to discussing subjective probabilities and to developing the elements of a
code of practice for obtaining more refined probability estimates.
Finally, risk analysis has been limited till just a few years ago because the ‘number
crunching’ task was too hard. Often, doing even quite simple stochastic analyses required
the development of special-purpose computer programs. Those days are practically gone
with the evolution of powerful and in some cases user-friendly software for risk analysis that
can be implemented on PCs. In the last part of this paper, some information about the
computing options now available is given.
Risk analysis is, and will remain, the art of the possible. But successful artistry needs to be
founded on a good knowledge of principles and technique. At least a few of these matters18
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are addressed above. The views and ideas given are offered as a small contribution to the
eventual production of better pictures of the risky reality that farmers face.
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